The revered teachers, in their inquiry into the nature of the Self and ultimate reality, considered and addressed a multitude of philosophical views. Having explained the refutation of a particular view, they indicated that by the same reasoning, the rejection of other remaining views is also made clear. Some argued that if the absence of an experiencer were due to the non-differentiation of the Self from the world, then the world itself would lose all distinction and meaning, collapsing into undifferentiated sameness. However, the scriptures use words like “origin” and similar terms, which establish that there is indeed a non-difference between the Self and the world, but not in the sense of total indistinguishability; rather, there is a subtle unity. Furthermore, perception and experience occur only when there is presence—something must be present to be perceived. This points to the existence of the Self as a distinct experiencer. Moreover, the existence of “the other”—that which is experienced—also affirms the reality of distinction. If it is objected that the Self is called non-existent, this is not so. The rest of the sentence and other scriptural passages clarify that what is meant is not absolute non-existence, but rather another attribute or aspect of the Self. This can be understood by analogy: just as a cloth, while made of threads, is not wholly separate from them, so too the Self is not entirely other than its manifestations. Similarly, as with breath and the like—entities that are both distinct and yet not separate—the relationship between the Self and the world is subtle, not absolute separation. When the scriptures designate the Self as “other,” it leads to certain problems, such as the impossibility of action and experience, for action requires a subject and object. Yet, the scriptures also specify something extra—a certain difference—showing that the Self is not completely identical with the world, but possesses a unique nature. If one were to compare the Self to inert things like stone, the analogy would fail, for the Self is conscious and not inert. If it is objected that dissolution, or merging, is observed and thus the Self must be destroyed, the answer is that this is not so; it is like milk, which transforms but is not annihilated. Just as gods and other beings undergo transformations without ceasing to exist, so too does the world. If one were to say that the Self, being partless, would either extend unduly to the whole or contradict statements of its indivisibility, the answer lies in scripture, whose authority is rooted in the revealed word (śabda). The Self is described in various ways in the scriptures, and these diverse attributes are indeed found within it. Moreover, the opposing view is shown to have faults, and all the attributes necessary for the Self are observed to be present. If it is argued that the Self cannot possess these attributes because it is without organs, this objection has already been addressed. There is indeed purpose in creation, for the world is not without aim. Yet, as in worldly affairs, creation is sometimes for the sake of play, not always for a fixed purpose. The Self is not subject to partiality or cruelty, for the results depend on other factors, as the scriptures show. If it is objected that there is no fair distribution of actions and results, the answer is that, because the chain of actions is beginningless, this is reasonable and also observed in the world. All required attributes are thus found to be possible in the Self. Turning to opposing views, it is noted that the arrangement of the world cannot be explained by mere inference, for such arrangement and activity are not possible without a conscious principle. If one objects that things combine like milk and water, even there the difficulty remains, as true unity is not established. Separation of the Self from the world is not established, nor is there dependence as in other cases. Since this kind of relationship is not found elsewhere—unlike grass and the like—the analogy does not hold. If one suggests a similarity to men and stones, the same objection persists. Furthermore, the Self cannot be considered a principal entity in the way these analogies suggest. In inference, if otherwise, there would be no power of knowledge. Even if such a view is accepted, the existence of the object (the world) cannot be established independently. Because of these contradictions, such views are unreasonable. Even if one tries to compare the relationship to that between the great and the small, or the long and the short, there is still no action possible in either case, and thus their non-existence is established. If inherence is accepted due to similarity, there still remains no finality, for the relationship is not satisfactorily explained. Existence, as taught in the scriptures, is indeed eternal. Yet, in the world, we see things possessing form and other attributes, so the opposite of pure formlessness is observed. Both ways of reasoning lead to faults, and because the Self is absolutely independent and does not possess attributes in a limited sense, it remains wholly free. Thus, the wise conclude that the Self is eternal, conscious, and blissful, transcending all partial views, yet immanent in all.